Recognizing this multiple identity in Madrid -and moving beyond the tendency to equate the capital with "the national" and with a kind of "eternal" Spanishness -has two important consequences for understanding both Spain's transition to democracy and the development of sub-national identities across the country after 1975. First, evidence of regionalism in Madrid demonstrates that every area of Spain, not just those on the so-called periphery, sought to define new forms of democratic identification specifically on the regional level in a context where nationalism was closely associated with the former authoritarian regime. Thus, in the decade and a half after 1975, new regional identities were not constructed simply "to legitimize a broad state-led political project," as some scholars have suggested.
3 Instead new regional affiliations were the means by which democracy came to flourish in post-Francoist Spain -and this was especially important in Madrid. In other words, Spain's democracy was primarily consolidated on the regional level.
It must not be forgotten that the transition to democracy, and the capital's future democratic course, was not set in stone in 1975 with the death of Francisco Franco, or even in 1978 with the completion of a new constitution. The late 1970s and early 1980s were years filled with uncertainty, ambiguity, and occasionally even violence. After nearly four decades of dictatorship, all Spaniards were faced with the task of redefining themselves and the place they lived. The historian Michael Richards has summed up this problem: "The challenge facing Spaniards in the period after the death of Franco was nothing less than the reinvention of Spain as a state and as a nation." 4 However, unlike other regions in the country, Madrid had no unique regional, ethnic, or linguistic tradition to serve as the foundation for a new post-dictatorial identity. In addition, the capital's large and diverse population made the task of creating a new democratic identity even more difficult. While these challenges were great, what was at stake was even greater. Failure to remake Madrid would mean the persistence of an 'authoritarian hangover' in the middle of Spain. As the country's most populous city and as the former center of the Franco regime, the transformation of Madrid was essential for the ultimate success of Spain's democratic transition.
Second, evidence of regionalism in Madrid calls into question the dominant center-periphery model of identity formation in the Spanish context and answers the missing "center" question, posed by such scholars as Mary K. Flynn and Xosé Núñez. 5 The recognition of a regional movement in the center shows that there was more to Madrid than some kind of vague or "monolithic" national identity against which peripheral regions defined themselves. As mentioned above, it also demonstrates that new democratic affiliations were formed specifically on the sub-national level all around Spain after 1978. And, as a result, Madrid becomes less of an exception at the center and more a part of a common process of "local" democratization that emerged in every region of the country.
6 This dispels the notion that the "center" is somehow intrinsically linked to the national identity of a country, when in fact national identity is a product of power, represented through an ideological program and transmitted through state institutions. Such a nationalist program simply was not in place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
To build the case for a more complex picture of geographical identity in Madrid, the rest of this article first explores the idea of a new regional sense of place in the capital within the context of preexisting neighborhood and national affiliations. It then presents specific evidence from public opinion surveys to demonstrate the development of a new madrileño identity in the mid 1980s.
First, on the most basic level, it is commonly acknowledged that there were different neighborhood affiliations across Madrid on the community or the district level. For example, residents identified with upper-class neighborhoods, like Salamanca; working-class neighborhoods, like Embajadores; bedroom communities, like Alcobendas and Pozuelo; and peripheral districts, like Vallecas. Again, as mentioned above, these vecinal identities peaked in the second half of the 1970s and then quickly declined with the demise of the capital's citizen's movement, which had originally developed in part as a response to the difficulties 5 See, for example, Mary K. Flynn, "Constructed identities and Iberia," Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 5 (2001) ; Xosé Manoel Núñez, "What is Spanish Nationalism Today? From Legitimacy Crisis to Unfulfilled Renovation (1975 Renovation ( -2000 , " Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 5 (2001) . 6 For a further discussion of the interplay between nationalism and regionalism in Madrid during this period see Hamilton M. Stapell, "Reconsidering Spanish Nationalism, Regionalism, and the Center-Periphery Model in the Post-Francoist Period, 1975 -1992 ," International Journal of Iberian Studies 20, no. 3 (2007 . of the Franco regime.
7 However, the new idea of "Madrid" that emerged in the early 1980s symbolized something larger than a neighborhood identity.
First and foremost, it was an urban idea, but one that transcended the limitations of a "city" or a "capital." Although the new Comunidad of Madrid (officially created in 1983) included rural communities, more than 90 percent of the population lived within the urban metropolitan area. 8 As a result, a new regional identity was shaped, in large measure, by the city of Madrid, but by the city defined most broadly. The bedroom neighborhoods on the periphery, the areas of work and recreation in the city's center, and the places of relaxation and excursion in the capital's hinterland, all made up the complex urban, social, and cultural structure that was understood as "Madrid." Thus, living in a bedroom community, attending a popular festival in the center of the city, barhopping from neighborhood to neighborhood, visiting a museum in the town of Alcalá de Henares, borrowing a book from a new biblio-bus, or passing the long weekend in the sierra all made up part of the unique madrileño experience.
The development of this new sense of place in Madrid also emerged due to efforts made by Madrid's political and cultural elite. During the early 1980s, the local and regional administrations of Madrid specifically promoted a new "civic," as opposed to an "ethnic," identity that emphasized tolerance and inclusion, which was adaptable to people from a variety of backgrounds. In particular, they stressed the democratic values of active participation and peaceful coexistence (convivenica). This was especially important in a region where more than fifty percent of the population had been born elsewhere. After leaving smaller and more traditional homes, these newcomers were faced with the task of assimilating themselves into the metropolis of Madrid. First-and secondgeneration immigrants were madrileños, but at first lacked the ties to a consolidated collective identity. A new "civic" identity, offered an agreeable urban, democratic, and inclusive option for Madrid's diverse population.
With half of Madrid's population also under the age of 30, these same characteristics were particularly attractive to the region's large youth population as well.
9 Born in the baby boom of the 1960s, Madrid's young people had not suffered the experience of the civil war, its aftermath, or the full repression of the dictatorship. Nor had they experienced May 1968. This was the 'beardless' generation stuck between the 'progres' on one side and the 'bunker' on the other. In other words, Madrid's youth represented neither 'old' Marxists of the left, nor reactionary conservatives of the right. They were instead the adolescents of the consensus-driven transition to democracy. A new sense of place that not only allowed, but promoted, modern cultural trends, free expression, and mass participation represented an alternative that was more attractive than any form of identification based solely on the traditional politics of either the left or the right.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the end of the dictatorship, coupled with the social changes that accompanied the dual processes of urbanization and modernization that began in the 1960s, prepared the way for new democratic regional identity in the capital. Within this context, a new sense of place based on the 'modern' aspects of Madrid's culture was the perfect fit for madrileños who were tired of being associated with centralism, oppression, and the authoritarian past. Of course, it must be said that this was a sense of place that not everyone identified with to the same degree, as feelings of identity are never uniform.
Nonetheless, as an urban island -squeezed in-between two rural Castillas -the new imagined community of Madrid represented something more than just a city or a capital. In the 1980s, it symbolized a region that could claim its own unique features, its own history, its own regional festivals, its own regional cultural institutions, and its own active and inclusive way of life. It also represented a place where residents were encouraged to feel 'madrileño,' and not simply Spanish.
At the same time, however, the formation of this new regional identity did not deny, or contradict, the existence of national affiliations in the capital -the third layer of identity. As the literal physical and political center of Spain, it was impossible to refute Madrid's connection to 'the national.' Nor did Madrid's local political elite try to create an identity that was exclusively regional. In an interview shortly before his death in 1986, Madrid's mayor at the time, Enrique Tierno Galván, admitted the importance of nationalist sympathies: "I confess to you that I am a nationalist, not a blind nationalist that transforms nationalism into prejudice [prejuicio] and falls into fanaticism, but a nationalist that defends ones nation, and, unfortunately, there are not very many of those today." 10 Moreover, it was even clear to those at the time that there was no reason to deny national affiliations, as local, regional, and national identities are not mutually exclusive.
Speaking in late January 1986 at a homage to Tierno Galván in the Club Siglo XXI, Madrid's new mayor, Juan Barranco, acknowledged the multiple layers of identity in the region of Madrid:
The three realities, national, regional, and local, that converge in the urban territory of Madrid can articulate themselves, without great difficulty, above all if there exists a harmony of purpose and a common will of progress in liberty. National, regional, and neighborhood [vecinal] consciousnesses articulate themselves, in the bosom of the city, in rational and natural harmony.
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So, in Madrid, the coexistence of multiple identities meant that residents could feel a simultaneous connection to the nation of Spain, the region of Madrid, and the neighborhood or district in which they lived. While it is difficult to gauge exactly how ordinary madrileños identified with these three different layers in the mid 1980s, public opinion evidence from the period demonstrates both a significant degree of regional affiliation and the presence of at least a 'dual identity' in the new Comunidad of Madrid.
First with regards to the creation of a new regional identity, a survey conducted in 1987 directly highlights a higher level of regionalist sentiment in Madrid than in the past. In contrast to declining regionalist political aspirations (defined as popular demand for greater autonomy) in the Basque Country, Galicia, and Valencia between 1979 and 1987, regionalist aspirations in Madrid actually increased during this same period.
12 In addition, although the highest regional sentiments in 1987 were found in the Basque Country and Catalonia, regionalist feelings in Madrid were within the same range as three other 10 José María Baviano, "'Yo no tengo futuro político; lo mío es concurrir con los vecinos'," El País, 20 January 1986.
11 Juan Barranco, "El Madrid de las libertades y los nuevos tiempos: conferencia en Club XXI," Villa de Madrid 1986, 15. 12 Francisco Alvira Martín and José García López, "Los españoles y las autonomias," Papeles de Economica Española 35 (1988): 403. The decrease in regionalist sentiment in areas such as the Basque Country and Galicia was probably due to regional aspirations being fulfilled by the development of the system of autonomous communities during this period.
autonomous communities with widely acknowledged regional identities: Valencia, Galicia, and Andalusia (See Table 1 ). Along with this indication of increased regional identification, there is also evidence that shows that feelings of national affiliation were no higher in Madrid than in many other regions of the country. Put another way, Madrid exhibited no special identification with the nation. In another survey conducted in 1987, 93 percent of madrileños described themselves as very proud or quite proud of being Spanish.
14 While this percentage is very high, the Comunidad of Madrid did not 13 Ibid.
CIS, Los españoles ante el segundo aniversario de la firma del tratado de adhesión de España a la Comunidad Europea (Madrid: CIS, 1988).
display the highest levels of national pride within Spain during this period. In fact, the vast majority of regions registered a slightly higher feeling of pride for a national identity than did Madrid. Specifically, feelings of national identity were higher in Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, Castilla-León, Galicia, Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia, and the Canary Islands than in the region of Madrid (See Table 2 Thus, by 1987, the region of Madrid simultaneously exhibited evidence of growing regional affiliations, and a level of national identification that was lower than or at par with other regions in Spain. Despite this evidence suggesting a more complex form of geographical identity within the capital, Madrid has nevertheless remained the region most closely associated with nationalism and Spanish national identity.
Probably the best evidence for this false assumption was that no one thought to ask the standard "dual identity" question in the region of Madrid during the 1980s. Despite the fact that this question had been asked in every other region in Spain since the late 1970s, it was not until 1990 that sociologists asked madrileños: "In general, do you feel more madrileño than Spanish, as madrileño as Spanish, or more Spanish than madrileño?" Before this time, sociologists appear to have thought that everyone in Madrid simply felt 'Spanish.'
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As it turned out, only 26.1 percent of madrileños felt exclusively 'Spanish' when the question was finally asked in 1990. The majority of the residents of Madrid, in fact exactly two thirds (66.6%), expressed some form of dual identity: either more Spanish than madrileño, as Spanish as madrileño, or more madrileño than Spanish (See Table 3) . 18 According to this evidence, in 1990, the region of Madrid was no different than any other region of Spain in terms of identity. Exactly like the majority of the residents in the other regions of Spain, most madrileños felt some degree of overlapping feelings of identification, rather than any kind of singular identity.
Although it is impossible to determine the exact levels of national and regional affiliation in Madrid around the time of Tierno Galván's death because of a lack of data, evidence from the years 1990 to 1995 seems to suggest that the levels of regional identification may have been even higher, and the levels of national identification even lower, in the mid 1980s. From 1990 to 1995, there was a distinct decrease in regional identification (from 4.4 to 1.6 percent 17 For further information on sociological studies regarding national and regional identity in Spain, see José Jiménez Blanco, La conciencia regional en España (Madrid: CIS, 1977 exclusively madrileño), while at the same time there was almost a doubling of national identification (from 26.1 to 49.7 percent exclusively Spanish). Again, (See Table 3 ). Followed into the past, those two trends suggest higher regionalism and lower nationalism in the region of Madrid in the mid to late 1980s. However, since the actual numbers from the mid 1980s are not available, the data from the year 1990 must be used for further analysis. When Madrid is compared more closely to other regions, the case for a 'multiple identity' that incorporated a significant degree of regional identification becomes clearer, and the argument for Madrid's monolithic 'Spanishness' becomes even more tenuous. This case can be made in two ways. First, several regions exhibited higher levels of national affiliation than Madrid. And, second, the level of regional identification in the capital was comparable to several autonomous communities with widely acknowledged regional identities.
With regards to national affiliation, in four separate regions a greater percentage of the population identified themselves as 'exclusively Spanish' than in Madrid (See Table 4 ).
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Those regions included: Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, the Balearic Islands, and Valencia. Likewise, Madrid fell into a group of four regions where only roughly 45 percent of residents identified themselves as predominately Spanish (either only Spanish or more Spanish than regional): Valencia (46.6%), the Balearic Islands (45.6), Castilla-León (45.1%), Murcia (46.2), and Madrid (45.4) . Based on this comparison, the level of national affiliation in the region of Madrid was clearly not unique or extraordinary during this period.
In terms of regional identity, 71 percent of the residents of Madrid expressed some level of regional identification (either exclusively regional, more regional than national, or as regional as national, or more Spanish than regional). In other words, almost three quarters of the population reported some level of affiliation to the region of Madrid. In addition, more than half (51.7%) of all madrileños expressed a level of regional identification that was equal to or greater than their level of national identification (either exclusively regional, more regional than national, or as regional as national). This figure for Madrid was comparable to Valencia (53.1%) and not that distant from the regions of Andalusia (65.9%) and Catalonia (65.7%), three regions with generally recognized regional identities. Based on this evidence, it is clear that, despite the many assertions to the contrary, there was a form of identity in the Comunidad of Madrid that was more complicated than a monolithic 'Spanishness.' In fact, it appears as though relatively strong regional affiliations had come to coexist with national and neighborhood affiliations in the capital during the 1980s.
Conclusion
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of the changes, Madrid in the mid 1980s was clearly no longer the same place it had been under the dictatorship. Madrid had changed so much, in fact, that the Queen of Sweden announced on a visit to the capital in 1983 -her first since 1970 -that she "found Madrid a complete stranger [desconocido] ." 21 Precisely while the Queen was away, the capital had become a more active, inclusive, and democratic community. Cultural mobilization was replacing passivity, and the movida madrileña was beginning to leave a definite mark on the capital. In addition, the 20 Ibid., 130. 21 "Madrid honra a los reyes de Suecia," Villa de Madrid, 1 April 1983, 5. residents of Madrid were also learning to be more proud of and to identify more closely with the place they lived. In an interview first granted in 1982 to the Spanish national television (TVE) program "Informe Semanal," and rebroadcast on 25 January 1986, six days after his death, Tierno Galván explained:
Before it was more important to be from a town in Andalusia, or Castile, or from the Basque Country than to be from Madrid. There one had roots and here one had nothing more than universality [universalidad] , which in the end was little, or nothing. Madrid has recuperated its roots and now madrileños feel proud to say that they are from Madrid, wherever they come from.
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The creation of this new form of democratic identity based on the region of Madrid did not, however, exclude other forms of identification in the capital. As described throughout this article, a regional affiliation made up just one part of a multiple identity that already included a connection to local communities, or neighborhoods, and to the nation. And, again, these identifications were not equal, nor were they static. In fact, the death of Tierno Galván in January 1986 in many ways brought an end to the official project to create a unique madrileño identity and with it the eventual decline of regional sentiment within the capital.
This decline specifically occurred because the political and institutional space that had originally allowed for its articulation closed in the second half of the 1980s. After the death of Tierno Galván in 1986, the national leadership of the PSOE was able to consolidate its power on both the national and local level, and readopt the newly transformed Madrid as the capital of a "Europeanized" Spain. Increasingly after 1986, the national PSOE, led by Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, reappropriated and redefined the image of the capital in its bid for European integration. In short, the goal was to turn Madrid into a capital -not a region -of a European "nation of nations." For the national leadership of the PSOE, Spain's "normalization" and integration into the rest of Europe was seen as the surest method of solving Spain's mounting economic difficulties and of overcoming the country's national identity "problem" bequeathed by the experience of the dictatorship. These efforts eventually led to the disappearance of a more participatory form of democratic regional identity in Madrid as the priorities of economic neo-liberalism and Europeanization increasingly came to dominate the capital in the second half of the 1980s. In addition, even though there was a degree of continuity within the regional government, no one replaced the independent spirit of Tierno Galván within Madrid's ayuntamiento after 1986. Instead, the capital's new young mayor, Juan Barranco, increasingly relied on the national government for support and guidance after the death of his mentor, Tierno Galván. As a result of all these changes, the notion of Madrid as an independent region had to be left aside by the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, thanks to the development of new regional identities both in the capital and around the country, Madrid's connection to its undemocratic past had been permanently severed and Spain's democratic consolidation was secure.
